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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
U-BEVA MINES,
a Corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
TOLEDO MINING CO.,
formerly AMERICAN
MINING CO., a Corporation,
Defendant-Respondent.

Case No.

11960

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action brought by appellant to declare
terminated and null and void, a lease agreement between appellant and respondent, and to recover damages from respondent for its wrongful dumping of
waste on appellant's ground.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the court. From a judgment, no cause of action, for respondent, appellant
appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment, and
that this court adjudicate that said lease agreement
1

is terminated, null and void, and assessment of damages in favor of appellant.
STATEMENT OF FACT
On July 1, 1963, appellant and respondent entered into "a mining lease and option" Exhibit 1p (b). Subsequent to entering into said agreement the
respondent entered into possession of the property
in question and commenced paying a minimum
monthly rental of $100.00 per month, and until the
notification by appellant to respondent of the 1967
delinquent taxes, the respondent paid the real property taxes each year as they came due.
On December 13, 1967, appellant by registered
letter notified respondent of the delinquent property
taxes for the year 1967, which respondent was required to pay pursuant to the lease agreement. See
Lease Agreement, Exhibit 1-p (b), also appellant's
letter of December 13, 1967, Exhibit 1-p ( d). On
December 18, 1967, the respondent, through its controller H. John Ricks, acknowledged receipt of said
Exhibit 1-p ( d) with respect to the taxes. See Exhibit 1-p ( e). Again by letter dated February 21,
1968 (Exhibit 1-p (f)) respondent was again advised of the delinquent taxes and was specifically advised, "as you know, this is sufficient cause for cancellation of your rights to this mining property."
The respondent after receipt of said letter failed to
pay said taxes. On the 29th of February, 1968, by
letter (Exhibit 1-p (g)) respondent was notified of
2

the termination of any rights of the respondent under the lease agreement for failure to pay the taxes.
There is no dispute that respondent did not pay
said taxes pursuant to the lease agreement; and pursuant to the letter of the appellant dated February
21, 1968 (Exhibit 1-p (f)) it was necessary that the
appellant pay said taxes.
Mr. James P. Cowley, counsel for respondent,
in a letter dated February 29, 1968, and mailed to
appellant, tendered a check for the full amount of the
taxes, penalty and interest. Exhibit 1-p (b). The
letter of Mr. Cowley was mailed the same date that
appellant notified respondent of its option to terminate the lease by reason of the failure of the respondent to cure said defect, to-wit, payment of the real
property taxes within the 60-day period. In fact, 77
days had expired since the respondent was first notified to pay the taxes. (December 19, 1967 - February 29,1968).
The leased premises are adjacent to other mining claims of the respondent in the same area. The
claims of appellant occupy an area of approximately
250 acres. R. 86. There was introduced in evidence
Exhibit 7-p and Exhibit 6-p, which show the area of
the leased property, and specifically Exhibit 6-p
shows waste dump "A" and waste dump "B" and
show the waste material that has been deposited upon
the leased premises. It was stipulated between the
parties that the area occupied by these dumps located
3

on the appellant's property constitutes an area of approximately 111/2 acres. R. 107.
It was stipulated that Exhibit 5-p be introduced

in evidence, which is a statement from, Mr. John A.
Bradshaw, project engineer for Gibbons & Reed Co.,
which shows the cost of removing these dumps "A"
and "B" from the land of the appellan't to the land
of the respondent. Said Exhibit 5-p also sets forth the
quantity of material which would have to be moved,
the distance it would have to be moved, and the cost
of removing the same. Mr. Bradshaw's exhibit se'ts
forth a total cost of $437,700.00 to restore the appellant's property to its original condition. Exhibit 5-p,
R. 85.
It was stipulated between the parties that the

lease agreement calls for minimum payments of
$100.00 per month, and that said payments had been
paid each month since the commencement of the lease
until February of 1968, after which time the checks
for said payment were n'dt cashed by the appellant
but were tendered to it. R. 90, 91.
Mr. Ken McGriffin testified on behalf of the appellant to the effect that he has a degree in earth
physics from the University of California, Los Angeles, 1950; that his present rela:tionship to the appellant is that of president and director. R. 91.
Mr. McGriffin also testified that at the time the
mining lease and option of July 1, 1963, was entered
into that the appellant did not own any other assets
4

other than the assets which were a part of said mining lease and option. R. 92.
Mr. McGriffin also testified that he had examined dump "A" and dump "B" as set forth on Exhibits 6-p and 7-p. R. 92. That the land of the appellant had been depreciated in value by reason of the
dumping of said waste by respondent on appellant's
land. R. 93. Further, Mr. McGriffin testified that
the dumping of waste from the land of the respondent to dumps "A" and "B", the land of the appellant,
is contrary to good mining practice. R. 93. The appellant's land is primarily mining land and that by
dumping waste material on portions of it you are
covering the surface, and should ore ever be found
beneath the dumps, this amount of waste would have
to be moved to get to the ore. R. 94. That the land
here in question and the adjacent land of the respon ·
dent is subject to open-pit mining, and that the operation which is on the property of the respondent
known as the Bwana Pit, which is shown on Exhibit
6-p, is an open-pit operation. R.94. Mr. McGriffin
testified in his opinion that where a mining company
leases property for the purposes of dumping large
amounts of waste on the leased ground, that said fact
should be specifically stated in the lease agreement,
otherwise it would be unethical to do such a thing. R.
95, 96, 97. Mr. McGriffin also testified that there
was plenty of room on the property owned and under
the control of the respondent upon which this waste
5

material could have been placed at the time it was removed from their open-pit mining operation. R. 98.
Mr. McGriffin testified that prior to the institution of the present lawsuit by the appellant that to
his knowledge no notice was ever given to respondent
by appellant of appellant's objection to the respondent using the appellant's property for the purpose
of dumping these waste materials. R. 101. However,
Mr. McGriffin also testified that he was at one time
employed as a consulting geologist by a Mr. Bogdanich, who at the time was the major stockholder of
respondent, and he was aware of material being removed from the open-pit operation of respondent and
being placed in dumps "A" and "B". However, at
said time he had no knowlege as to who was the owner
of the land, other than respondent, upon which said
waste was being dumped. R. 101. Mr. McGriffin also
testified that the dumps in questfon were created to
his knowledge in the years 1960 to 1963 or 1964. R.
102.
Mr. Ralph Tuck testified on behalf of the appellant to the effect that he has a PhD degree from the
University of Oregon in Geology; that he is an independent consulting mining geologist and had been
such for approximately 11 years. Prior to that time
he had been in charge of western exploration for U.S.
Smelting & Refining Co. for approximately 21 years.
R. 103, 104. Dr. Tuck testified that ordinarily the
waste and overburden from open-pit operation is
placed on the company's own property, or if land is
6

leased or rented for that purpose, the owner of the
land is specifically advised that waste or overburden
is going to be placed upon the land. R. 104. Dr. Tuck
testified that the placing of waste upon the ground,
such as in dumps "A" and "B", is detrimental in that
it conceals the surface so that surface examination
cannot be made and it is more difficult to explore in
the case of drilling 'to go through waste rock, and certainly more expensive, and if anything is found, then
it is necessary to remove the waste material. R. 105.
Dr. Tuck also testified that in his opinion it is good
mining practice to advise a land owner when land is
going to be used for the particular purpose of dumping waste and overburden. R. 105.
Mr. Cowley on cross-examination of Dr. Tuck
stated:
"Q. Doctor, would it change your opinion on
anything anywhere any, if the lease provided - had the fallowing language in
it:
the lessee shall also have the
right to take possession and to use and to
operate the land and the entire surface
and sub-surface of any and all of the said
mining claims as lessee may deem necessary and convenient in connection
exploration, development and mmmg
(under ground or open pit) operation on
adjoining properties?'"
"A. In order to render an opinion on that,
and I am really not in a position to render
an opinion on the
- I have not
read i t - but that spec1f1c clause, yes. If
the intent, however, is to obtain this prop7

erty for the purpose of exploration and
development of that property that is a
different thing, and if it was used, I would
say, for the deposit of waste it would be
a subterfuge." R. 105, 106.
Dr. Tuck further testified:
" ... that in all major companies, or small, on
mining operations he states specifically what
the land is going to be used for". R. 106.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
RESPONDENT FAILED AND REFUSED TO
PAY THE TAXES ON THE LEASED PROPERTY, AS REQUIRED BY THE LEASE AGREEMENT, AND PLAINTIFF, PURSUANT TO THE
TERMS OF THE LEASE AGREEMENT, TERMINATED ALL INTEREST OF THE RESPONDENT UNDER THE TERMS OF SAID LEASE
AGREEMENT. THE LOWER COURT ERRED
IN NOT ADJUDIC.A:TING THAT SAID LEASE
AGREEMENT WAS NULL AND VOID.

On July 1, 1963, appellant and respondent entered into a ·"mining lease and option" (Exhibit 1-p).
On D€cember 13, 1967, plaintiff, by registered
letter, notified defendant of the delinquent property
taxes for the year 1967, which defendant was required to pay pursuant to the lease agreement. (See
lease agreement, Exhibit 1-p (b), also appellant's
letter of December 13, 1967, Exhibit 1-p ( d). On December 18, 1967, defendant, through its controller,
H. John Ricks, acknowledged receipt of said Exhibit
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with respect to the taxes. (See Exhibit 1-p ( e). Again
by letter dated February 21, 1968, (Exhibit 1-p (f)
respondent was again advised of the delinquent taxes,
and was specifically advised, "As you should know,
this is sufficient cause for cancellation of your rights
to this mining property." The defendant, after receipt of said letter, failed to pay said taxes. On the
29th of February, 1968, by letter (Exhibit 1-p (g)
respondent was notified of the termination of any
rights of the respondent under the lease agreement
for failure to pay the taxes. There is no dispute that
the defendant did not pay said taxes pursuant to the
lease agreement, and pursuant to the letter of the
plaintiff dated February 21, 1968, (Exhibit 1-p (f)
it was necessary that the plaintiff pay said taxes.
Paragraph 9 of the lease agreement (Exhibit
1-p (b) provides:
"Lessee agrees to pay all taxes levied or
assessed upon all lessee's machinery, equipment and property, or service improvements,
placed upon or which are appurtenant to the
demised premises. Taxes hereafter levied or
assessed either a,qainst the said mining premises or the ore produced therefrom, including
taxes assessed by reason of net annual proceeds and occupation, or other taxes imposed
by governmental agencies, shall be apportioned on a pro-rata basis as between lessee and
lessor depending on the net smelter return to
be applied as set out in paragraph 2 hereof,
and lessee shall pay the same, and be entitled
to deduct any such taxes charged by lessee and
so payable by lessor from the minimum month9

ly payments or
smelter returns payable
and neither lessor or lessee shall
be
m any way for any other tax exercised, levied, or assessment upon or against the
other."
Paragraph 15 of the lease agreement (Exhibit
1-p (b) provides:
"For any breach of any covenant or agreement herein specified to be kept and performed
by lessee, lessor may terminate this agreement
60 days after delivering to lessee a written notice of lessor's intention to terminate the same
which written notice sets forth the breach of
covenant or agreement being complained of,
provided however, that if lessee is thus in default as claimed by the lessor, lessee may, within 60 days following the receipt of said notice,
avoid such termination and cure said default
by performing the covenant or agreement
breached. If such default has not been cured
within said 60-day period, said termination
shall thereupon become effective at the option
of the lessor, and all of lessee's rights hereunder shall be forfeited except the right of lessee
or its agents to remove its property and equipment from said demised premises as hereinabove provided."
In accordance with said provision, plaintiff notified the defendant of the breach of the lease agreement by failure to pay taxes; the defendant did not,
within the 60-day provision, cure said defect and
breach; whereupon the plaintiff, at its option, by letter dated February 29, 1968, terminated all rights of
the defendant under said lease agreement.
10

The notification and the letters set forth as Exhibits are uncontroverted evidence that the defendant
has breached the lease agreement, and said lease
agreement has been terminated and is no longer a
valid document, and the court should so adjudicate.
The court in its memorandum decision dated December 9, 1969, stated:
"l. 'T'hn
shonkl not be drdared
ated because of defendant's failure to make a
timely and direct payment of real property
taxes. Tender was made. The plaintiff had sufficient funds from payments on the lease with
which to pay said taxes, and which could have
been taxed against the defendant."

The tender here referred to by the court consisted of a letter dated February 29, 1968, written by
James P. Cowley, counsel for respondent, in which
he tendered a check for the taxes, penalty and interest, Exhibit 1-p (b). It is interesting to note that
said letter of Mr. Cowley was mailed the same day
that appellant noti'fied respondent of its option to
terminate 'the lease, by reason of the failure of respondent to cure said defect within the 60 day period. In
fact, 77 days had expired since respondent was first
notified to pay the taxes. (December 19, 1967-February 29, 1968).
Further, respondent, subsequent to the trial, attempted for the first time since the lease agreement
was instituted to claim that it had a credit built up
' could be applied to the delinquent
for taxes, which
11

taxes which the defendant failed to pay. The lease
agreement specifically provides, " ... Taxes hereinafter levied . . . shall be apportioned ... and Lessee
shall pay the same, and be entitled to deduct any such
taxes charged by Lessee and so payable by Lessor
from the minimum monthly payments or net
smelter returns payable hereunder ... " The wording
of the lease is clear and unambiguous to the effect
that it is the obligation of the Lessee to pay the taxes.
Whether or not Lessee is entitled to deduct a proportionate share of said tax
the minimum monthly
payments or net smelter returns payable hereunder"
is of no consequence since the respondent failed to
comply with the provision for the payment of taxes
in the first instance.
Further, there is no evidence in the record to indicate that the respondent has any accrued credit for
payment of taxes. This issue was never asserted by
the respondent at the trial, and is not an issue before
this court at the present time.
It is interesting 'to note, however, in connection
therewith, that paragraph 2 of the lease agreement,
Exhibit 1-p, sub-paragraph (b), specifically provides
that any payment of actual royalties in excess of the
minimum monthly royalty shall only be credited toward any further rentals and/or royalty becoming
due during the current calendar year, but such minr
imum monthly royalty payment shall not be credited
or accumulated to apply towards rentals or other royalties due subsequent to the then calendar year. It is
12

obvious from the construction of the lease and the
acquiescence of defendant that it was never intended
that there should be any tax credit accumulated.
Respondent, in its memorandum to the trial
court (see copy in the record), spent considerable
time in attempting to claim an unconscionable forfeiture by appellant under the lease agreement. Here
again, the respondent never asserted, nor is there
anything in the pleadings, to indicate that there is an
issue of forfeiture involved in this case. The lease
agreement specifically provides tha:t if the taxes are
not paid the appellant has the right to terminate the
lease. The minimum monthly rental which the respondent has been paying specifically gives the Lessee, respondent, the right to take possession of the
premises, to explore, mine and develop, and to do and
perform any and all types of work thereon, etc. The
court should keep in mind that this lease agreement
has been in effect since July 1, 1963. The respondent
has never paid anything more than the minimum
monthly rental payment.
If the respondent is claiming that there is an unconscionable forfeiture, then certainly it should have,
at the trial of this action, demonstrated what its actual damages had been as compared to the gain of the
appellant. The only evidence with respect to damages
at the trial of this action were the damages suffered
by the appellant in the sum of $437,700.00 for. the
wrongful use o'f the premises by the respondent contrary to the lease agreement and contrary to the ex13

pert testimony of both Dr. Ralph Tuck and Mr. Ken
McGriffin. The respondent produced no evidence or
testimony which would controvert or contradict the
testimony of either of these two expert witnesses.
With respect to cases on forfeiture, it is respectfully submitted that this Court as early as September, 1923, in the case of Malmberg, et al, vs. Baugh,
62 Utah 302, page 331, became one of the leading
quoted by most courts of general jurisdiction, with respect to the law of forfeitures. See
also Utah Law Review, Volume 3, page 30, with respect to an article enti'tled, "Forfeitures under Real
Estate Installment Contracts in Utah." See also
Young vs. Hansen, 117 Utah 591, a case decided in
1950, and also Perkins et al, vs. Spencer, 121 Utah
468, which cover the elements of forfeiture of contracts in the State of Utah. Nowhere in any of these
decisions or any subsequent decisions of this court
does the court indicate or determine that a seller under a contract or a lessor under a lease agreement,
such as here, does not have the right to terminate the
lease agreement where a direct violation of the terms
of said contract or lease agreement occurs. The court
always starts from the position that the default having been made by the defendant, the determination
is then whether or not the forfeiture is unreasonable
and would grant to the plaintiff an "exorbitant recovery" or "impose a hard and arbitrary penalty on
the defendant." See Justice Crokett's statement in
14

this regard in the case of Spencer vs. Perkins, 121
Utah 468.
Here again, the respondent never raised any issue as to damages suffered by 'the defendant which
could be termed a penalty. The only damages suffered in the instant case were suffered by the appellant,
and which damages were explicitly proven by appellant in the sum of $437,700.00.
In other words, the respondent cannot, with impunity, say, "I can violate the terms of the lease
agreement, and even though I do, you have no right
to terminate the lease." The lease has been terminated by the appellant, and the only element now to be
considered by the court, if, in fact, such an element
exists, pertains to the consequences following such
termination. The minimum monthly payment, even
though it could conceivably be applied toward the
purchase of the property in the event respondent
elects 'to exercise the option agreement and purchase
the property, is certainly no compensation to appellant for the total damages suffered by appellant. The
evidence permits of no other conclusions.
POINT II.
IT IS CONTRARY TO 'THE LEASE AGREEMENT, AND CONTRARY TO GOOD MINING
PRACTICE, FOR RESPONDENT TO USE THE
SURFACE OF THE LEASED PREMISES FOR
THE PURPOSE OF DUMPING WASTE THEREON FROM I'TS MINING OPERATIONS FROM
ADJOINING LAND. THE LOWER COURT
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ERRED IN FAILING TO ASSESS AGAINST
RESPONDENT THE UNCONTROVERTED
DAMAGES PROVEN BY APPELLANT.

Paragraph 1 of the lease in question allows the
lessee ". . . the right to take possession and 'to use
and operate the land and the entire surface and subsurface of any and all of the said mining claims as
lessee may deem necessary and convenient in connection with its exploration, development in mining (underground or open pit) operations on adjoining property."
Paragraph 3 states that the "lessee shall conduct
all operations ·on the leased premises in the manner
necessary to good, minerlike, and economical mining,
so as to develop and take out leased deposits or with
due regard to the development of the leased deposits,
to the preservation of the workability of the workings
of the leased premises. Nothing herein, however, shall
be construed as in any way limiting the rights of lessee granted pursuant to paragraph 1 hereof."
The testimony of Dr. Ralph Tuck, a consulting
geologist for the past eleven years, and for twentyone years prior to that in charge of Western Exploration for the United States Mining and Smelting
Company, was to the effect that such a lease provision
would be a subterfuge if i't were intended to cover the
alleged dumping of waste upon a lessor's property.
In Dr. Tuck's .opinion, if leased property is to be used
for such purposes this fact should be made known,
without question, to the lessor and fully set forth in
16

the lease agreement. The dumping of waste upon a
lessor's property in the manner carried on by defendant is contrary to good minerlike practices and destroys the value of the leased premises. See R. 103-106.
Further, pursuant to the testimony of Mr. Ken
McGriffin, who holds a degree in earth physics from
the University of California at Los Angeles, and a
consulting geologist since then, the dumping of the
waste by the defendant upon the plaintiff's property
is contrary to good minerlike practices and has destroyed the value of the leased premises, and has
caused damages which will necessitate the removal of
said waste. Further, the damages suffered by the
plaintiff by reason of the dumping of waste upon the
property of the appellant amounts to the sum of
$437,700.00 to-wit: the cost of removing said waste.
See Exhibit 5-p. The waste in question could have
been readily dumped upon the respondent's own land.
(R. 95-99) The respondent produced no witnesses
or testimony contrary t:o the testimony of Dr. Tuck
or Mr. Ken McGriffin, or contrary to the information
contained in Exhibit 5-p, and therefor such evidence
is uncontroverted, and appellant should be awarded
judgment against defendant for damages in the sum
of $437,700.00.
The following annotations from 83 ALR 2d 73
support this position:
"Where a mineral lease for the removal of
coal from two contiguous tracts is granted and
the lessee acquires the rights to mine a third
17

tract which connects the two so leased, the lessee may be enjoined from dumping sla'te and
hauling coal from the third tract on and over
the leased tract said the court in Brasfield vs.
Burnell Coal Co. ( 1912 180 Ala. 185, 60 Southern 382, holding that the lessee has no right to
use the surface in aid of an adjacent mining
operation even though such will eventually connect the leased tract. The court further held
that the mere fact that this procedure was necessary, practical or economical would not, in
the absence of express of implied agreement,
authorize it, and no such right could be inferred from the fact that the term of the lease was
to extend until all the coal had been mined from
both tracts."
"In Himrod vs. Fort Pit Mining and Milling Co. (1915) CA 8 Colo. 220 F 80, the plaintiff sought to enjoin the defendant from depositing the waste rock from an adjacent coal
mine at the mouth of the tunnel which the defendant held under a lease and deed of perpetual right of way from the plaintiff providing,
among specifically enumerated privileges, for
the right to use the tunnel in 'working the
mines they now own or may hereafter acquire.'
In reversing a judgment for 'the plaintiff and
ordering a new trial, the court said that passing by implication with every grant are all
those things reasonably necessary to the exercise thereof, and that while the necessity need
not be absolute, i't may not be a matter of mere
convenience, and the requisite degree thereof
to permit such depositing of waste rock was a
question for the jury. Subsequently, in Himrod
vs Fort Pit Mining and Milling Co. (1916) CA
8 Colo., 238 F. 746, after retrial, the court ap18

proved jury findings that it was not reasonably necessary for the grantee to dump waste
rock on the surface estate even though the tunnel mouth was some 10,000 feet above sea
level on a steep slope not adapted to many uses
which had long been used by the grantor for
dumping similar waste from his own mine."
"And although remanding the matter for
additional evidence as to damages, the court in
Pike-Floyd Coal Co. vs. Nunnery (1929) 232
Ky. 805, 24 SW 2d 614, nonetheless held that
the mineral lessee was liable to the surface
owner for depositing waste rock from an adjacent mine on the surface of the leased tract,
even though the lease contained express permission for 'removal of the products taken out
of any other lands.' The court further stated
that while the lessee was entitled to make reasonable use of all the rights conferred upon
him, the lease contained no provision allowing
the lessee to so deposit waste from adjacent
mines and concluded that the lessee would be
liable for damages occasioned thereby."
POINT III.
THE LEASE AGREEMENT IN QUESTION IS
INVALID AS IN VIOLATION OF SECTION
16-10-74, UCA 1953, WHICH PROVIDES THAT
STOCKHOLDER APPROVAL MUST BE OBTAINED WHERE A LEASE OF ALL OR SUBSTANTIALLY ALL OF THE ASSETS OF THE
CORPORATION IS MADE OUTSIDE THE USUAL COURSE OF BUSINESS OF THE CORPORATION. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
FAILING TO ADJUDICATE SAID LE'ASE
AGREEMENT NULL AND VOID ON THIS
BASIS.
19

The facts are definitely clear and uncontroverted that the lease agreement in question was never approved or ratified by the stockholders of the appellant
corporation. See testimony of Ken McGriffin, president of the appellant corporation. See also Exhibit
1-p (f), letter of February 21, 1968, wherein Mr.
McGriffin as president of the appellant corporation
notified respondent that the stockholders had voted
to reject the approval of the lease agreement by a vote
of 2,977,003 votes against to 215,000 votes for approval. See also the testimony of Mr. McGriffin to the
effect that the only substantial asset of any value in
the corporation was the property which was the subject matter of the lease agreement between plaintiff
and defendant. (R. 12, 13) See also the testimony
of Mr. Robertson to the same effect. (Dep. 11)
Accordingly, the lease agreement not having
been approved by a majority vote of the stockholders
of the plaintiff corporation is null and void, and the
court should so adjudicate.
Respectfully submitted,
McCULLOUGH & McCULLOUGH
LELAND S. McCULLOUGH
304 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for
Pmintiff and Appellant
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